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THE WORST international terrorist attack ever-involving
four separate but coordinated aircraft hijackings-rocked
the United States on September 11, 2001. Suicidal terrorists
used the aircraft as guided missiles to kill thousands of victims.
The 19 hijackers, all young men of Middle-Eastern descent, are
believed to have belonged to the al-Qaeda terrorist network.'
The al-Qaeda network is alive and well, comprised of thousands
of members operating in at least 62 countries. The network's
goal is to fight a "holy war," or jihad, against the United States
and the western world with the intent to destroy it.2 To such
terrorists, commercial aircraft are prized as convenient and dra-
matic weapons of mass destruction.
Hijackings have plagued the airlines since the beginning of
civil aviation.' Hundreds of hijackings and bombings have re-
sulted in thousands of deaths around the world.4 Such incidents
were more common prior to the installation of baggage screen-
ing detectors.5 Before that fateful September 11 th day, the air-
* J.D., George Mason School of Law. The author has worked in the airline
industry since 1989.
1 Biohazard News, Profile: Al-Queda, The Osama bin Laden Terrorist Network, at
http://www.biohazardnews.net/binladen.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
2 Id.
3 Between 1949 and 1985 alone, there were 498 successful and 281 failed hi-
jacking attempts worldwide, and 1539 persons killed in eighty-seven aircraft
bombings. See Michael S. Simons, A Review of Issues Concerned with Aerial Hijacking
and Terrorism: Implications for Australia's Security and the Sydney 2000 Olympics, 63J.
AIR L. & CoM. 731, 738 (1998). Also for extensive information on fatality rates
for more than 100 airlines around the world see Airsafe.com, most requested
information at www.airsafe.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
4 Simons, supra note 3, at 738.
5 The metal detectors and security screenings we take for granted are a recent
development. Such security measures were viewed as a threat to individual pri-
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line strategy for hijackings involved obsequious compliance with
hijacker demands. Obviously this technique no longer works on
suicidal killers. The government and the airlines are currently
struggling to protect the public from a new breed of hijackers
that expect to die along with their victims.
Today's terrorists may be armed with plastic weapons, an-
thrax, explosives so small they can fit in the heel of a sneaker,
and more. With fervor and lack of concern for self-preservation,
would-be hijackers could even overtake a flight with no weapons
at all. Thus, the traditional magnometer screening is losing its
effectiveness.
El Al, Israel's airline, receives daily threats, yet its tight security
has prevented terrorist attacks for over thirty years.6 In essence,
El Al's security system works from the assumption that every pas-
senger is a threat, and treats him or her accordingly. Every pas-
senger is scrutinized and questioned. El Al agents use phone
vacy, much as CAPPS II is today. "On February 17, 2002, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) was substantially reorganized under Public Law 107-71, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). On that date, the Transporta-
tion Security Administration (TSA) assumed all of the FAA's Civil Aviation Secur-
ity functions, including aviation security research and development." The TSA
managed to hire 44,000 new federal employee airport screeners in a matter of
months. John H. Marburger III, Statement before the Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives (June 24, 2002), at http://www.house.gov/sci-
ence/hearings/ful102/jun24/marburger.htm.
6 Stacy Perman, The El Al Approach: A Look at the Israel Airlines Security Procedures,
Business 2.0 (Nov. 2001), available at http:www.business2.com/articles/mag/
0,1640,17508, ff.html. Each passenger is psychologically evaluated. Carry-on
bags are checked multiple times. Every car that enters Ben Gurion International
Airport in Tel Aviv is examined. Plain-clothed guards help secure each airport
building. Passengers are asked a series of specific questions including, "Who paid
for your ticket?," "What is the purpose of your travels?," and "When did you book
the flight?" The questions are designed to evoke an observable reaction. Officers
carefully scrutinize the passengers' answers for tone of voice, body language, and
quickness of response. If the passenger gives unsatisfactory answers, a different
officer will ask the passenger more questions. Security personnel might also sep-
arate flight companions to make sure that their stories match. A psychological
evaluation of the passenger is combined with information about the passenger
previously obtained by El Al and Interpol.
El Al is also strict with luggage requirements. All luggage goes through a de-
compression chamber designed to trick bombs that are set to go off when the
barometric pressure indicates that the plane is in the sky. X-ray technology de-
tects liquid explosives. Security personnel examine every piece of carry-on lug-
gage and all luggage is also matched to its owner. On layover stops, passengers
must reclaim their luggage. Samidh Chakrabart & Aaron Strauss, Carnival Booth:
An Algorithm for Defeating the Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System, 7 FIRST
MONDAY 10 (Oct. 2002), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue7_10/
chakrabartv#note34.
CAPPS ii
contact or references in Israel to verify the passenger's identity
or purpose for the trip. Strip searches are fairly routine. Every
piece of luggage is both electronically and hand inspected.
Still, American flag carriers transport more people in two days
than El Al does in a year. It is impracticable to implement inva-
sive, expensive security procedures similar to those of El Al for
every one of more than 600,000,000 passengers traveling annu-
ally.7 Further, the vast majority of airline travelers are law-abid-
ing citizens and should not be subjected to intrusive physical
searches or interrogations like common criminals. If the United
States government strips Americans of essential liberties as a re-
sult of September 11th, it is assisting the terrorists in their goal
of destroying "America the free." There needs to be a better
way to prevent known and suspected terrorists from ever getting
another chance to use American aircraft as weapons of mass
destruction.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPUTER ASSISTED
PASSENGER PRE-SCREENING SYSTEM II
In the aftermath of the September 11 th attacks, the Transpor-
tation Security Administration (TSA) was founded in 2001 as a
division of the Department of Homeland Security.8 Its mission
is to protect the nation's transportation systems. The Computer
Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System II (CAPPS II)I is an au-
tomated screening system authorized by Congress as part of the
TSA Enabling Act.10 It is a threat assessment tool, with an em-
phasis on prevention, based on continuously changing intelli-
gence information." The TSA claims that CAPPS II will
enhance aviation security, refine the passenger secondary
7 In 2001, 622 million passengers boarded 8.8 million U.S. airline flights. Bu-
reau of Transportation Statistics, Decline in Airline Passengers in 2001 Ends 10-
year Growth, BTS Year-End Report Shows (May 2002), at http://www.bts.gov/
PressReleases/2002/btsO 1_02.html.
8 See supra note 6.
9 The TSA selected Lockheed Martin Management and Data Systems to build
CAPPS II. Transportation Security Administration Briefing Room, Press Release,
TSA Selects Lockheed Martin Management and Data Systems to Build TSA Pas-
senger Pre-Screening System (Feb. 2003), at www.tsa.gov/public/display?content
=248.
10 Description of CAPPS II as stated on the TSA website. Id.
11 Id.
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screening selection process, and improve airport passenger
flow. 1 2
Under CAPPS II, airline personnel will be required to elec-
tronically submit each passenger's name, address, and tele-
phone number to the TSA prior to issuing a boarding card.1"
Although current regulations require passengers to present
photo identification to the agent, there is currently no way of
verifying the authenticity of the ID. The TSA's main computer
is linked to various law enforcement and commercial
databases.' 4 First, the TSA will confirm the identities of passen-
gers and identify known foreign terrorists or persons with terror-
ist connections. 5 Then, it will perform criminal and credit
checks on each person. Through the use of sophisticated data-
mining algorithms, it will also analyze patterns of travel,
purchases, and a variety of other undisclosed classified factors. 16
The factors that CAPPS II will analyze will remain classified in-
formation in order to prevent terrorists from learning how to
undermine the screening process.
From all this information, the TSA will assess whether an indi-
vidual poses a potential threat, or appears harmless and "rooted
in the community." The "passenger stability indicators" include
length-of-residence, home ownership, and income." Based on
these indicators, each traveler will get a red, yellow, or green
score. The vast majority of travelers will not have a suspicious
background and will get a green score. They will pass through
standard security procedures and may be subjected to an occa-
12 Transportation Security Administration, Briefing Room, Testimony & Tran-
scripts, Statement of Transportation Security Administrator Admiral James M.
Loy before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security
(May 13, 2003), at http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?content=405.
13 Transportation Security Administration, Briefing Room, Press Release, TSA
Selects Lockheed Management and Data Systems to Build TSA Passenger Pre-
Screening System (Feb. 2003), at http:/www.tsa.gov/public/display?content=248.
14 Torch Concepts, Homeland Security: Airline Passenger Risk Assessment (Feb. 25,
2003), at http://www.abditum.com/~rabbi/531B3 Roark.pdf.
15 Transportation Security Administration, Briefing Room, Press Releases,
CAPPS II News Release (July 31, 2003), at http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?
content=634.
16 See Torch Concepts, Homeland Security: Airline Passenger Rise Assessment (Feb.
25, 2003), at http://www.abditum.com/-rabbi/53B3_Roark.pdf.
17 Id. An airline's disclosure of such confidential information is the subject of
much controversy and is also the subject of a class action lawsuit byJetBlue pas-
sengers who claim that their personal data went into this report without their
consent. For more information on the lawsuit see http://www.dontspyon.us/jet-
blueclassaction.html; see also, Ryan Singel, JetBlue Fesses Up, Quietly (Sept. 19,
2003), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,60502,00.html
sional random search. Those who trigger the yellow rating will
have their checked and carry-on baggage inspected and may be
questioned. A red score is a "no-fly" indicator, resulting in a
denial of boarding. It is certain that law enforcement will be
summoned, but it remains unclear what the person's rights will
be at that point."8
Thus, CAPPS II is an advanced profiling system created to de-
termine which passengers are more likely to pose a threat to
airline security.19 This will enable the TSA to focus its height-
ened screening efforts on persons likely to pose a potential
threat, the "selectees." Passengers will benefit from quicker se-
curity lines and being "cleared" electronically in the time it takes
to print a boarding card. This focus on "the needle" rather than
"the haystack" represents a major shift from today's screening
protocols. Because profiling is so controversial due in part to
racial sensitivities, airport security screeners have gone out of
their way to ensure that security procedures are applied without
regard to personal characteristics. 20 Airline and TSA employees
are instructed to focus on specific behaviors and utilize a "but/
for" test in evaluating suspicious passengers.2 1 They are in-
structed to ask themselves, "but for this person's perceived race,
ethnic heritage or religious orientation, would I have subjected
this individual to additional safety or security scrutiny? ' 22 Thus,
ethnic considerations are not factored in. Yet, consciously ig-
noring racial factors requires an irrational denial of history and
present circumstances. The result has been that flight crews, in-
cluding pilots, little old ladies, and mothers with young children
18 For example, upon getting a red light, does the suspect have the right to
remain silent? To an attorney? To view the record that the accusations are based
upon? It has been implied that one does not have the right to "walk away" at that
point.
19 Id.
20 Ellen Baker, Flying While Arab: Racial Profiling and Air Travel Security, 67 J. AIR
L. & COM. 1375, 1390 (2002). Although certainly not dispositive, the results of an
informal survey conducted by a newspaper at two major airports in late January
2002 are interesting. Of the more than 1000 passengers observed, only between
5 and 10 percent were selected for extra inspection at the boarding gates. Of
those passengers selected, most were white males followed by white females. "Al-
though dozens of people who appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent boarded
the flights, only two received extra screening." Bob Von Sternberg, Arab-Ameri-
cans Fear They Are Being Singled Out, But the Government and Airlines Say the Increased
Security Checks Are Random, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), Feb. 3, 2002, at 23A.
21 Von Sternberg, supra note 20.
22 Id.
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are searched at roughly the same rate as foreign-born young
men. 23
CAPPS II changes the presumption that everyone is an equal
security risk. CAPPS II is an expansion of the original CAPPS
system in use since 1998.24 Additionally, the FAA has main-
tained a "no-fly" list and a "selectee" list since 1990.25 The exis-
tence of these lists was suspected for many years, but was only
confirmed after the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) won a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit
against the TSA in April 2003.26 These lists are based upon
criminal records, suspicious travel history, and several dozen
other unspecified factors.27 However, unlike the current system,
in which data stays within individual airlines' reservation sys-
tems, the new setup will be managed by the TSA. Accordingly,
only government officials with proper security clearance will be
able to use it. It is unknown how many dangerous people have
been deterred by CAPPS I. Significantly, between nine and 11
of the 19 hijackers on September 11th were flagged as potential
23 Even some members of Congress are unhappy about regularly being
"wanded" by security. 'You have 535 members of Congress who are frequent
flyers," Rep. John Mica, Chairman of the House Transportation Committee's avi-
ation panel, said in July 2002. "People are not happy when there aren't some
common sense approaches to security. Shaking down 80-year-old ladies, Medal
of Honor winners and 5-year-old kids makes no sense." A.P, Lawmakers Question
Progress in Airline Security Since Sept. 11, USA TODAY, TRAVEL NEWS (July 23, 2002),
at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2002/2002-07-23-security-hearing.htm
24 Transportation Security Administration, Briefing Room, Press Releases,
CAPPS II News Release (July 31, 2003), at http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?
content=634. CAPPS I was implemented in January 1998-instituted in part by
Northwest Airlines in response to the 1996 crash of TWA 800 and the Atlanta
Olympics bombing, both initially thought to have been terrorist related. Sub-
committee on Aviation, Hearing on Aviation with a Focus on Passenger Profiling
(last visited Jan. 20, 2004), at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/02-
27-02/02-27-02memo.html.
25 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Documents Show Errors in TSA's "No-
Fly" Watchlist (Apr. 2003), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/foia/watch-
listfoiaanalysis.html. EPIC made an FOIA request in October 2002. Id. The
TSA responded in March and April 2003. Letter from Patricia M. Riep-Dice,
Transportation Security Administration, to Mihir Kshiroge-Electronic Privacy In-
formation Center (Mar. 21, 2003), available at http://www.epic.org/foia-docs/
airtravel/tsajletter.pdf.
26 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Documents Show Errors in TSA's "No-
Fly" Watchlist (Apr. 2003), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/foia/watch-
listfoiaanalysis.html. EPIC has also posted on its website a large file of con-
sumer complaints regarding mistaken placement on these watch lists, and the
difficulty with clearing one's name from such lists. Id.
27 Torch Concepts, Homeland Security: Airline Passenger Risk Assessment (Feb. 25,
2003), at http://www.abditum.com/~rabbi/53B3_Roark.pdf.
threats by the original CAPPS. 28 In a fatal error, none of the
men were searched or questioned because the system gave a
pass to passengers who did not check any bags. 29 People with-
out checked bags are now included, and the CAPPS II system
has added an undisclosed number of additional variables.3 °
Although airlines are not discussing the profiling system pub-
licly, at least one airline is cautiously optimistic about the pro-
gram. One more terrorist incident could ruin the struggling
airlines not to mention the national economy. The airlines are
desperate to prevent any type of incident and, therefore, must
support some type of passenger screening. An added advantage
of CAPPS II is that some of the stifling liability is taken off the
airlines and placed on the government. This liability includes
responsibility in the event of security failure, as well as individual
lawsuits brought as a result of unjust profiling.
How effective will CAPPS II be? Would the "shoe bomber,"
Richard Reid, have been caught by a profiling program? The
answer is "maybe." His criminal record, perhaps combined with
his conversion to Islam and his name change,3" would have
probably triggered a yellow flag. If so, the heightened security
procedures would have detected the explosives in his shoes. In-
stead, he nearly succeeded in bombing an American Airlines
flight. 12 Clearly, something must be done to prevent radical
criminals like Reid from sauntering through security while
grandmothers are frisked.




30 Torch Concepts, Homeland Security: Airline Passenger Risk Assessment (Feb. 25,
2003), at http://www.abditum.com/-rabbi/53B3_Roark.pdg.
31 "Reid scraped by in his early years selling drugs, breaking into cars, and
mugging people, according to recent news reports. These activities led to time in
juvenile detention, then jail. In prison, he became interested in Islam, and on
his release in 1995, he took up study at a mosque in south London. There, he
may have met Zacarias Moussaoui, the suspected 20th hijacker in the Sept. 11
attacks. By 1998, Reid was moving with more radical Islamic groups.. .He grew a
beard and changed his name to Abdel Rahim." Gail Russell Chaddock, Lessons of
Shoe-Bomb Incident Groups Like Al Qaeda May Now be Using Operatives who Don't Fit the
Polic Profiles, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 28, 2001, at 1.
32 Id. Reid had enough explosives in his shoes to blast a large hole in the
fuselage. He may have succeeded if he had simply elected to ignite the explosives
in the lavatory instead of at his seat, where he drew the attention of the flight
attendants who heroically subdued him. Id.
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The TSA and many members of the traveling public hope that
the CAPPS II profiling system will offer a solution to this di-
lemma. After all, preventing terrorist attacks is an important na-
tional goal. If we have "nothing to hide," why should Americans
be concerned about CAPPS II?
III. CAPPS II AS AN INVASION OF PRIVACY
Many Americans, not just civil libertarians, are alarmed about
the CAPPS II profiling system." The Internet is abuzz with con-
cerns that "Big Brother is watching you." 4 A Californian was
successful in promoting a consumer boycott35 of Delta Air Lines
when it was rumored that Delta was testing the CAPPS II system
for the government. 6 Now it is rumored that JetBlue Airways
has replaced Delta Airlines as the "testing platform" for CAPPS
11.37
33 Electronic Privacy Information Center, In the Matter of Privacy Act Notice Con-
cerning Aviation Security Screening Records (Feb. 24, 2003), at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/airtravel/tsacomments2.24.2003.html. As if CAPPS II were not enough,
the TSA is currently testing biometric scanning for face recognition and the use
of voice stress analysis. This utilizes the physiological characteristics of a human
voice pattern to infer malevolent or deceptive intent.
34 Id.; American Civil Liberties Union, News, ACLU, Conservatives, Civil Rights
Groups Agree: CAPPS II Raises Serious Privacy and Security Concerns (Aug. 25, 2003),
at http://www.aclu.org/safeandfree/safeandfree.cfm?ID=1335480=206; see also
Boycott Delta, CAPPS 11 testing has been restarted, at http://www.boycottdelta.com
(last visited Jan. 20, 2004); Privacy Activism, Passenger Profiling Violates Rights,
Doesn't Improve Safety, at http://www.privacyactivism.org (last visited Jan. 20,
2004).
35 Boycott Delta, CAPPS 11 testing has been restarted, at http://www.boycottdelta.
corn (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
36 Id. Delta's official response to customer inquiries regarding CAPPS II is as
follows:
CAPPS II is a federal program administered by the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) as a result of the heightened threat
of terrorism to our country. Delta's role in the CAPPS II program
will be limited to providing data to the TSA that Delta already col-
lects from passengers as part of our normal reservations and ticket-
ing process. Delta is not running credit or background checks on
customers. The security of Delta's passengers and safeguarding
passenger information remains a top priority. For more detailed
information regarding the program, please contact the TSA.
Customers may be directed to the TSA s Consumer Response Center at 1-866-
289-9673.
37 "A group of passengers has filed a class-action lawsuit againstJetBlue Airways
Corporation for its disclosure of passenger information to a Defense Department
contractor. The lawsuit alleges fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract
and invasion of privacy." New York-basedJetBlue acknowledged that it had given
information from about 5 million passenger records to Torch Concepts of Hunts-
The factors that will be analyzed by CAPPS II are largely classi-
fied and unknown. In addition to performing a criminal check,
a credit check, and a confirmation of identity, one can speculate
what additional factors would be both useful and technologically
feasible to include. On its website, the TSA has said that it will
access financial and transactional data, yet it is vague about what
that will encompass. Certainly travel patterns and payment
methods will be included in the search since they were already
incorporated in the original CAPPS. In addition to government
and public records, an astounding array of information is cur-
rently being collected by private firms on every person in
America." This information is available to the government and
private parties for purchase. 9 Some factors that may be in-
cluded in an individual's data dossier include race, religion, po-
litical affiliations, credit history, employment, spending habits,
charitable donations, unusual books purchased or checked out,
and visits to certain websites. All of this information will be ag-
gregated to find not only convicted criminals, but also to iden-
tify those whose personal interests and backgrounds fit a profile
for those likely to engage in certain forms of criminal activity.
Briefly, privacy concerns and ethical dilemmas that are likely
issues with a large scale, surreptitious data-mining system
include:
The principle of treating everyone as a suspect without
cause is wrong. Requiring citizens to submit to background
investigations to travel in their own country is un-American.
ville, Alabama. Torch, a defense contractor, produced a study, "Homeland Se-
curity: Airline Passenger Risk Assessment," that was purported to help the
government improve military base security. KCAL 9, Passengers SueJetBlue: Law-
suit Filed over Data Disclosure (Sept. 23, 2003), at http://kcal9.com/finance/
financestory_266085701.html.
38 For example, the private sector company ChoicePoint, Inc. has multi-million
dollar contracts with about thirty-five federal agencies including the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to provide
personal information. ChoicePoint's database contains over ten billion records
indexed by Social Security numbers. The information is gathered from public
records, private detectives, and credit records. See Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-
in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on You, It May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 2001, at Al.
39 Id. Since 2001, EPIC has been involved in a lawsuit with the Justice and
Treasury Departments over a FOIA request it filed to learn more about govern-
ment use of private data. The case is ongoing, but as EPIC's president David
Sobel said, it revealed information such as a $67 million government contract
with the data-collection agency ChoicePoint. William Wew, Proposal Would Link
Agencies' Funding to Privacy Protesting, NAT'L J. TECH. DAILY (July 29, 2003), at
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0703/072903tdl.htm.
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" There is too much secrecy in the program. The govern-
ment has no right to spy on its citizens.
* It is immoral to collect personal data on individuals and an-
alyze them with sophisticated algorithms to try to predict a
person's future behavior. There are no "thought crimes."
* Personal information can fall into the wrong hands and be
misused. Never before has so much information from so
many sources been collected in a single place.
" The government may use the information gathered for un-
authorized purposes. "Function creep" is inevitable as the
IRS, law enforcement, and various other agencies seek ac-
cess to the data. Furthermore, people will be arrested at
the airport for infractions that have nothing to do with se-
curity of the flight.
* Racial, ethnic, and even gender discrimination will rear its
ugly head as people are scrutinized based on these immuta-
ble characteristics.
" Some indications suggest that the data will remain on file
for 50 years.40
" There is the potential for identity theft, fraud, and sale of
information to private interests and businesses.
" People may lose their fundamental right to travel if they
have bad credit or owe fines or child support.
Furthermore, there are practical considerations:
" The error rate is unacceptable. If just one percent of the
population scores a false positive, more than 6 million un-
justified inquiries are performed per year.
* Once a person is erroneously targeted as a "red" or "yel-
low," the procedures for removing oneself from the list are
onerous.
41
40 Many sources, such as Boycott Delta, Delta Airlines Treats Americans like Ter-
rorists, at www.boycottdelta.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2004), stated that the data
would remain for 50 years. In response, the TSA issued a press release on July 31,
2003, stating in pertinent part: "Eliminated from aJan. 15 Federal Register notice
was language that led some to believe that large amounts of information about
individuals would be collected and maintained for up to 50 years." Unfortu-
nately, the notice did not clarify how long this information would be maintained.
Transportation Security Administration, Briefing Room, Press Release, CAPPS II
News Release, New Notice Outlines Changes to CAPPS II System (July 31, 2003),
at http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?content=634.
41 EPIC has collected a file of TSA complaints that document the near impossi-
bility of getting a name removed from the watch list, even if it was erroneously
included. See EPIC, Complaint for Injunctive Relief, available at http://
www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/tsa-foia-suit.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
CAPPS II
* Frequent credit checks result in lower credit ratings for
travelers.
" The system will not prevent future hijackings since hijackers
will figure out and undermine the system.42 For example,
this can be accomplished via identity theft.
* The system will encourage airport employees to be compla-
cent, as they will allow the computer to do evaluations for
them.
IV. THE BALANCE BETWEEN SECURITY AND PRIVACY
This paper does not purport to judge the morality or efficacy
of CAPPS II. Rather, it explains what is known so far about the
program and the controversy surrounding the privacy-security
tradeoff, and it analyzes this novel program against the privacy
protections offered by the Fourth Amendment. CAPPS II is a
technologically advanced tool that profiles travelers and ana-
lyzes their backgrounds to look for lifestyle patterns that indi-
cate a potential threat to a flight. The surreptitious use of
personal data may be considered an illegal search and implicate
the Fourth Amendment. By analyzing Fourth Amendment pre-
cedent, this paper attempts to predict how courts will balance
the tradeoff between security and privacy, and either justify or
strike down in whole or in part this revolutionary surveillance
system.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is esoteric, complex, and
frequently inconsistent.4 Unlike other fundamental rights
42 In a dissertation, two MIT graduate students developed a complex algorithm
that allegedly undermines the methodology of the original CAPPS system.
In this paper, we show that since CAPPS uses profiles to select pas-
sengers for increased scrutiny, it is actually less secure than systems
that employ random searches. In particular, we present an al-
gorithm called Carnival Booth that demonstrates how a terrorist
cell can defeat the CAPPS system. Using a combination of statisti-
cal analysis and computer simulation, we evaluate the efficacy of
Carnival Booth and illustrate that CAPPS is an ineffective security
measure. Based on these findings, we argue that CAPPS should not
be legally permissible since it does not satisfy court-interpreted ex-
emptions to the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment.
Samidh Chakrabarti & Aaron Strauss, Carnival Booth: An Algorithm for Defeating the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening System (May 16, 2002), at http://www.swiss.
ai.mit.edu/6805/student-papers/spring02-papers/caps.htm.
43 Professor Wayne R. LaFave, in analyzing the Fourth Amendment, attempted
to untangle the nine search and seizure decisions issued during the Supreme
Court's 1982-83 term. He proclaimed these cases, as a group, to be "illogical,
inconsistent with prior holdings and generally, hopelessly confusing." Wayne R.
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cases, such as the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court has
not shied away from making sweeping proclamations over the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In addressing the privacy
concerns posed by technological advances, the pendulum con-
tinues to swing back and forth between autonomy and interfer-
ence. Many exceptions to the search and seizure prohibitions
have been added in the past several decades to allow for greater
law enforcement powers. Yet while Fourth Amendment privacy
is being eroded, its protections are simultaneously more impor-
tant than ever. Public and private technological marvels are
now capable of removing all vestiges of privacy. In the recent
past, an information super-network like CAPPS II was unthink-
able and threatening. Now many Americans are understandably
afraid to fly and willing to sacrifice privacy for a promise of
security.
Still, there is no way to make flying entirely safe, and there is
no easy answer to the profiling issue. Whether the profiling sys-
tem will actually be effective in deterring terrorism remains to
be seen. Many questions are unanswerable due to the secrecy
that is required of the project. Although this paper focuses pri-
marily on the Fourth Amendment, the TSA must show that its
CAPPS II system also comports with the First,4 4 Fifth, and Four-
teenth Amendments. For instance, it is settled law that claims
asserting a search was motivated by race will be decided not
under the Fourth Amendment, but under equal protection.45
The TSA's challenge is to "balance" the tension between se-
curity and privacy.46 In the world of public opinion, the TSA
LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, No-
torious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (1983).
Such decisions offer poor guidance to those responsible for conducting adminis-
trative searches. "Without understanding the individual Fourth Amendment pro-
tections at issue, how can society meaningfully participate in debates about the
future of such protections in airline security?" Jamie L. Rhee, Rational and Consti-
tutional Approaches to Airline Safety in the Face of Terrorist Threats, 49 DEPAUL L. Rv.
847, 866 (2000).
- Obviously, the First Amendment implicates religion-based searches, but it
also encompasses those based upon association and speech, as in the case of po-
litical activists.
45 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
46 In a speech, Admiral Loy, director of the TSA, said the TSA would create an
independent oversight board for the screening system. "TSA is committed to the
very American proposition that our rights and our security are complementary,
not competitive or contradictory," Loy said. Robert O'Harrow Jr., Aviation ID
Systems Stirs Dorlots; Senate Panel Wants Data on Impact on Passenger Privacy, WASH-
INGTON POST, Mar. 14, 2003, at A16.
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along with the airlines must demonstrate that advantages in pre-
screening passengers to prevent potential terrorists from board-
ing outweigh a rational and proportional decrease in Ameri-
cans' expectation of privacy. Public opinion and political
support are crucial to the implementation of CAPPS II. For ex-
ample, a similar but broader data-mining program, the Total In-
formation Awareness System, was put on an indefinite hold due
to public outcry and Senate opposition to its secretive and inva-
sive data collection and use.4 7 Similarly, the European Union is
very critical of the TSA's new program. CAPPS II conflicts with
EU laws protecting personal data because the program also
screens Europeans who fly to the United States.48 Still, TSA's
director and spokesman Admiral James M. Loy is optimistic that
CAPPS II can be implemented, while maintaining respect for
privacy rights. In a speech, Loy said, "TSA is committed to the
very American proposition that our rights and our security are
complementary, not competitive or contradictory. ''49 Organiza-
tions ranging from the ACLU to the ACU disagree.
V. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
This paper aims to see how this surveillance tool, both radical
and revolutionary, will be viewed in the light of Fourth Amend-
ment privacy protections. The Fourth Amendment to the Con-
stitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
47 Audrey Hudson, Lawmakers Seek to Limit TIA, WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 17,
2003, at A5. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which
administers the program, recently changed the name to "Terrorism Information
Awareness." According to DARPA, the purpose of TIA is to identify potential
terrorists by comparing information in a broad range of databases that might
offer clues. DARPA often has cited the example of using TIA to prevent a truck
bomb attack by searching for patterns indicating a group of foreigners who are
traveling together, renting trucks and buying materials that could be used as ex-
plosives. Testing such a scenario would require the system to have access to
credit-card records, airline itineraries and car-rental records. Ryan Singel, Penta-
gon Defends Data Search Plan (May 21, 2003), available at http://www.wired.com/
news/privacy/0,1848,58936,00.html.
48 Sara Kehaulani Goo, Passenger-Screening Plan Assailed: EU, Budget Office Among
Those Saying System Is Not Ready, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 26, 2003, at A8.
49 O'Harrow, supra note 46.
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describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.5 0
VI. PROTECTION AGAINST ILLEGAL
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Basically, the Fourth Amendment regulates the overall ability
of the government to obtain information through searches and
seizures.5 1 Searches and seizures are not limited to their literal
meanings but encompass the taking of information reasonably
believed to be confidential.
52
The essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safe-
guard individual privacy and security.5 3 It prevents arbitrary gov-
ernmental invasions by imposing a standard of reasonableness
upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, includ-
ing law enforcement agents. 54
One of the central reasons that the Framers created the
Fourth Amendment was to guard against general warrants. 55
Law enforcement is prohibited from conducting unwarranted
searches into citizens' private lives, possessions, and records to
look for evidence of wrongdoing.5 6
Since the purpose of the CAPPS II screening system is argua-
bly to examine passengers' backgrounds, past actions, and affili-
ations in order to anticipate whether the individual poses a
50 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Free-
dom, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1085 (2002).
52 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (involving not a search and
seizure but a compulsory production of business papers which the Court likened
to a search and seizure). Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding
that the attachment of a listening and recording device to the outside of a tele-
phone booth constituted a search).
53 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
54 Id. Also, the courts have established that airline searches, although adminis-
tered by private airline employees, are considered state actions by state actors.
Thus, the reasonableness standard applies to airline employees as well.
55 Solove, supra note 51, at 1107 n.130.
56 "Dataveillance gives the government essentially unlimited discretion to
search through masses of personal information in search of suspicious activity,
without specifying in advance the people, places or things it expects to find.
Dataveillance allows fishing expeditions in which the government is trolling for
crimes rather than criminals, violating the privacy of millions of innocent people
in the hope of finding a handful of unknown and unidentified terrorists," said
Jeffrey Rosen, law professor at George Washington University. Roy Mark, Trolling




potential threat to a flight, CAPPS II appears to be in conflict
with the Fourth Amendment's protections. A complicated body
of law has evolved to resolve Fourth Amendment issues, and va-
rious exceptions to the rule have been created. Much of the
recent case law deals with technological advances that permit
non-physical searches that could not have been anticipated by
the original amendment. The technological capabilities of the
CAPPS II system are remarkable, and were certainly not fore-
seen by the Founding Fathers. However, the principle of the
Fourth Amendment protection of privacy against overreaching
governmental intrusion has not changed.
VII. PROBABLE CAUSE AND WARRANT REQUIREMENTS
In order to intrude on an American's5 7 person, belongings, or
dwelling, the government must have probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed. Probable cause exists when
"the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowl-
edge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that a
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a
crime. "58 By using CAPPS II, airlines are not expected to be
criminal investigation units solving past crimes. They are focus-
ing on suspects that are "about to commit a crime."
Courts have generally recognized searches as being reasona-
ble if they properly balance the degree of intrusiveness, the mag-
nitude and frequency of the threat, and the efficacy of
alternatives to the search.59 Unless an exception applies, a
search warrant is required. Physical airport searches are done
without warrants due to an exception carved out especially for
this type of search.
57 The Fourth Amendment does not apply to foreign visitors. The Fourth
Amendment protects U.S. citizens who go abroad and aliens who have voluntarily
entered U.S. territories and developed substantial connections with this country.
The Supreme Court has determined that the Fourth Amendment's reference to
"the people" refers to "a class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with the U.S. to be consid-
ered part of that community." See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 265 (1990).
58 United States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 825 (1990) (citing United States v. Greene, 783 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.
1986)).
59 Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). This is
explained in the section called Administrative Search Exception. See infra section
VII.C.
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Generally, in order to get a warrant for a search, a law en-
forcement official has to present the evidence to a neutral mag-
istrate and show suspicion or probable cause.6" Court cases have
further clarified exactly what constitutes a minimal level of ob-
jective justification.61
One could argue that search warrants are a moot point since
more than 99% of search warrant requests are routinely
granted.62 Yet, warrants promote fair dealing by the police in
several ways. Warrants require officers to document their re-
quests for authorization, and therefore, officers are unlikely to
use them unless their suspicions are substantiated.63 Further,
government officials are prevented from "dreaming up post hoc
rationalizations. 964
The CAPPS II system is in some ways analogous to the warrant
requirement protection. CAPPS II gathers and analyzes pre-ex-
isting information in a manner similar to the way law enforce-
ment might observe suspicious behavior and perform a
background check of a person of known identity. Based upon
this information, the computer system makes a determination as
to whether a search of the party is justified, much as a neutral
magistrate examines the preliminary evidence and decides
whether to issue a warrant for additional search procedures.
CAPPS II will then issue "warrants" for heightened security pro-
cedures only for those "selectees" whose profiles created suspi-
cion, or "probable cause." Thus, warrants and "yellow scores"
permit searching of individuals suspected of being "about to
commit a crime. 6
5
VIII. KATZ V. UNITED STATES: A REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
In Katz, the Supreme Court modified its longstanding test for
judging privacy violations.66 Prior to this case, the Court held
that absent physical intrusion, there was no unlawful search or
seizure. Here, police officers surreptitiously affixed a listening
6o Katz, 389 U.S. at 355.
61 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.
62 2002 Wiretap Report, at www.uscourts.gov/wiretap02/contents.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2003).
63 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REv. 842, 848 (2001).
64 Solove, supra note 51, at 1127.
65 Hoyos, 892 F.2d at 1392.
66 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
device to a telephone booth that Katz regularly used.6 7 Al-
though the Court was expected to debate the intrusiveness of
the device on the phone booth, it instead made the broad state-
ment that the Fourth Amendment protects people not places.68
Thus, Katz shifted the definition of privacy from being place-
based to being person-based. As a result, any discussion about
CAPPS II need not involve the importance of locations in an
airport or on an airplane. Rather, Katz indicates that the Fourth
Amendment may protect anything a person "seeks to preserve as
private" without regard to where the information is located:
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.69
[That is,] the capacity to claim the protection of the Amendment
depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but
upon whether the area was one in which there was reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion. 70
Furthermore, Katz propounded a test to determine whether
there is an expectation of privacy upon which one may 'justifia-
bly" rely.71 This is regarded as one of the most fundamental
shifts in privacy law.72 To determine the threshold for justifiable
reliance, Justice Harlan created the "reasonable expectation
test" which balances the interest in protecting individuals from
government intrusion with the interest in protecting society
from criminals. 7 Two elements must be satisfied in order for an
expectation of privacy to be reasonable:
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 351-52.
70 Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (holding an official had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in an office he shared with others although he
owned neither the premises nor the papers seized); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.
91, 96 (1990) (holding that an overnight guest in home has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy); cf Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
71 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. Justice Harlan, concurring, formulated a two pronged
test for determining whether the privacy interest is paramount: "first that a per-
son have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id.
at 361.
72 Justice Harlan's opinion has been much relied upon. See, e.g., Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92
(1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980).
73 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
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(1) Subjective privacy-Did the person exhibit a personal ex-
pectation to be left alone from government intrusion?"4
(2) Objective privacy-Is the personal expectation one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable?75
Do airline travelers have an actual expectation that they will
travel free of government intrusion? On the contrary, people
demand protection from the government. Flying has its risks,
and the government works with the airlines to minimize danger.
Throughout the history of commercial aviation, the government
has been regulating aircraft maintenance, air traffic control, li-
censing of pilots, and more. Passengers expect and demand
that weapons and hazardous materials be confiscated from
others at the security checkpoints. They willingly open up their
baggage for inspection and subject themselves to metal detec-
tion machinery. 76 Without this important governmental over-
sight, people would be even more apprehensive about flying. Of
course, the physical intrusions into baggage, "wanding," shoe in-
spections, and the like, routinely done by TSA agents are of a
very different nature than the covert background checks that
the CAPPS II system will require.
Does the knowledge that one is subject to a physical inspec-
tion at the airport imply that one has consented to a virtual data
inspection? Katz asks whether a person has an actual expecta-
tion of privacy at that moment.77 People are aware that their
luggage might be inspected, but don't suspect that their credit is
being checked. The CAPPS II program is being discretely im-
plemented and neither flyers nor the majority of airline employ-
ees have heard of it. Then again, hardly anyone knows about
the no-fly lists that the FAA has maintained for more than a dec-
ade. Most Americans are also unaware that their banks are re-
quired to collect data for the government and that personal data
is being collected in various ways. If one is interested enough,
74 Though this test was established in a concurrent opinion, it is widely used.
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-
44 n.12 (1978).
75 Id.
76 Admiral Loy says that once CAPPS II is in place, passengers will be subjected
to fewer incidents of high-level random screening. Transportation Security Ad-
ministration, Statement of Transportation Security Administration Administrator
Adm. James M. Loy Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Home-
land Security (May 13, 2003), available at www.tsa.gov/public/
display?content=486.
77 Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
this information is available on request or on the Internet. Is
ignorance an excuse?
The government intrudes on one's privacy in a variety of ways
without public outcry because few people are even aware of the
intrusion. Even if the government was concerned with giving
people notice of the data-mining system, it is unclear how it
would proceed. It is impermissible for the government to condi-
tion "subjective expectations" by informing people that no pri-
vacy exists in a situation that is normally considered private. So,
even if the government mandated that a privacy alert warning
appears on the back of each ticket, it may not legitimately de-
stroy a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court held that,
for example, "announcing that henceforth all homes would be
subject to warrantless entry," thus destroying the legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy, is forbidden.78
That question leads to the second prong of the test: Is it rea-
sonable to have an expectation of privacy in an airport or as an
airline passenger? How has this expectation changed since the
quadruple hijackings of September l1th? Just as people's ap-
prehension about flying has gone up since that date, their ex-
pectations of privacy have clearly gone down. Travelers now
expect to present identification at several points before board-
ing and to remove their shoes. Further, they see national
guardsmen at the airport and possibly have armed air marshals
and pilots on board their flight. Clearly, flying has changed.
A. APPLYING THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST
What seems to have emerged since Katz is a balancing of the
tensions between individual and state interests. The balancing
test requires "an assess [ment] of the nature of a particular prac-
tice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense
of security, balanced against the utility of the conduct as a tech-
nique of law enforcement. '79 In the CAPPS II context, the sub-
jective test of "the impact on an individual's sense of security" is
irrelevant as it is entirely impossible to apply to the nation as a
whole, since one person's security is another's tyranny. Instead,
the analysis must consider the overall intrusiveness of the
program.
78 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
79 White, 401 U.S. at 786-87 (Harlan,Jr.,J., dissenting) (balancing test of United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte).
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The Katz balancing test was used in authorizing sobriety
checkpoints where all vehicles were briefly stopped, and drivers
questioned and observed for evidence of intoxication.8 ' The Su-
preme Court held that, "[i]n sum, the balance of the State's in-
terest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this
system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the
degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly
stopped, weighs in favor of the state program. 81
Contemporary airline security procedures commenced in
1968 with the Sky Marshals program and the use of the magne-
tometer.8 2 A great deal of litigation ensued, charging that the
common metal detectors and x-rays violated the right of privacy.
Although private companies performed airport screening for
decades, the level of government participation in airport search
programs was enough to bring any such search within the reach
of the Fourth Amendment." Upon a 1973 challenge to these
procedures, it was determined that pre-boarding screening of all
passengers and carry-on articles sufficient in scope to detect the
presence of weapons or explosives is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment if persons are able to avoid the search by
electing not to board the aircraft.84 The goal of safer skies justi-
fied the inconvenience and privacy intrusion to airline
passengers.
Applying this balancing test, the Court would undoubtedly
view the aim of prevention of terrorist hijacking and sabotage to
be an important public interest. However, the utility of CAPPS
II will be a contested issue. Given the classified nature of the
80 Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
81 Id. at 455.
82 A brief history of the air marshal program is located at The Marshals Moni-
tor, The Marshals Service Pioneered the Air Marshal Program, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/marshals/monitor/jan-2002/an2-1.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2004).
83 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that since late
1968, government's participation in airport search program has been such as to
bring any search conducted pursuant to that program within the reach of the
Fourth Amendment; that a pre-boarding screening of all passengers and carry-on
articles sufficient in scope to detect the presence of weapons or explosives is rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment, if a person is given the right to avoid
search by electing not to board the aircraft; that such a search does not violate
the constitutional right of travel; that choosing to board aircraft after being given
the choice of leaving is essentially a "consent" to search).
84 Id. The court required that such a search does not violate the constitutional
right of travel and that choosing to board an aircraft after being given the choice
of leaving is essentially a "consent" to search.
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data, it is unclear how effective CAPPS II will be in furthering
the goal of safer skies, especially as an incremental improvement
over CAPPS I. It is also unclear how the courts would evaluate
the degree of intrusion posed by CAPPS II data-mining, consid-
ering that in the name of national security, even the courts will
not be privy to the classified system input.
A recent case used the balancing test to determine what type
of public interest was required to justify an intrusive state spon-
sored program under the Fourth Amendment.8 5 The Indianap-
olis police set up a checkpoint to look for drug trafficking and
other wrongdoing with a secondary purpose of finding drunk
drivers.8 6 Although it is generally accepted that a person has a
lower expectation of privacy while in a vehicle than one has in a
more permanent type of structure,87 the Court struck down this
type of roadblock. Seizing illegal drugs apparently was indistin-
guishable from the general interest in crime control, and gen-
eral searches for evidence of wrongdoing are prohibited under
the Fourth Amendment. 8 The Court explained its rationale:
"the constitutionality of such checkpoint programs still depends
on a balancing of the competing interests at stake and the effec-
tiveness of the program."89 Indianapolis' checkpoint program is
not justified by the "severe and intractable nature of the drug
problem."9 0
However, in an earlier case, Delaware v. Prouse,91 the Supreme
Court suggests that it would approve a similar checkpoint pro-
gram with the goals of getting unlicensed drivers off the road
and locating stolen vehicles, even absent probable cause. The
Court suggested that the states check drivers' licenses and regis-
trations using "methods for spot checks that involve less intru-
sion or those that do not involve unconstrained exercise of
discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-
type stops is one possible alternative. '9 2 In fact, some states have
been doing this type of checkpoint for several years.9 Thus, the
85 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
86 Id.
87 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) (collecting cases); United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-09 (1982).
8s Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32.
s9 Id. at 47.
9o Id. at 42.
91 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663. (1979).
92 Id.
93 See Robert L. Farb, The Fourth Amendment, Privacy and Law Enforcement, Popu-
tar GOVERNMENT, Spring 2002, at 13.
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Court implies that it would accept a program like CAPPS II
where all travelers are subject to scrutiny, as long as the check is
not too intrusive and officials have limited discretion. Appar-
ently the Court believes that enforcing licensing and registration
rules outweighs the burden on an individual's privacy, yet en-
forcement of drug laws does not.
Given these prior rulings, the Court would most likely view
the need to prevent airline hijacking as being at least as impor-
tant as roadside checkpoints to stop unlicensed drivers. It is also
likely that it will view passenger prescreening as being at least
somewhat effective in preventing such crime. Further, preven-
tion of hijacking is distinguishable from intercepting illegal
drugs. For one, drug use, unlike hijacking, does not put anyone
in imminent danger of death except maybe the user. Thus, us-
ing the Katz standard for reasonable expectation of privacy bal-
anced against intrusion, the CAPPS II program is likely to be
upheld.
B. KYLLO V. UNITED STATES: A TECHNOLOGICAL
INVASION OF PRIVACY
In Kyllo, agents, suspicious that the defendant was growing
marijuana in his home in a triplex, used a thermal imaging de-
vice to scan the building for heat associated with high-intensity
lamps used for indoor marijuana cultivation.94 After the exte-
rior scan detected heat, the agents obtained a warrant to search
the home. They found marijuana and the defendant was in-
dicted on federal drug charges.
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court vacated the conviction because the use of the heat scan to
discover what was happening inside the home was an unlawful
search.9 5 "Where, as here, the government uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of a private home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment 'search,' and
is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. 96
It is unclear how this expansion of privacy protection would
apply to CAPPS II. On one hand, Kyllo addresses searches of the
home and may be limited to these cases. However, a case can be





made that there are similar expectations of privacy in one's per-
son, one's luggage, and one's private information.
On the other hand, Kyllo implies that the Court rejects "vir-
tual" invasions of privacy made feasible by technological pro-
gress. Privacy groups rejoiced at the ruling, which they hope
will place new limits on technology-assisted searches in a variety
of areas.97 Presumably this would include biometric scanning of
crowds, X-ray scanners to see through clothes, and possibly even
the type of data-mining utilized by CAPPS II. The CAPPS II sys-
tem certainly can be considered a "device that is not in general
public use," and it can be used to analyze information that
would have previously been unknowable without intrusion.
Even the government is unsure how Kyllo will apply to a host
of new technologies. Three days after this ruling, House Major-
ity Leader Dick Armey asked U.S. Attorney General John Ash-
croft to review the constitutionality of Carnivore, the FBI's
Internet sniffer.9" The TSA has not asked the Justice Depart-
ment for an evaluation of its program in light of Kyllo. Whether
Kyllo will be interpreted broadly or narrowly remains to be seen.
C. POTENTIAL FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONS
FOR AIRPORT SEARCHES
It has been established that passengers have a privacy interest
in both their carry-on and checked luggage.9 9 Thus, a literal
reading of the Fourth Amendment makes one wonder why air-
port searches are permitted at all, since there is no claim that
the person being searched is dangerous or has committed a
crime.1"' In fact, it was only after extensive litigation that today's
security checkpoints and metal detectors were permitted."' In
order to accommodate such airport searches, an entire body of
law evolved, creating two exceptions to Fourth Amendment
search and seizure protections. The administrative search doc-
trine and the "stop and frisk" doctrine allow for searches with
little or no individualized probable cause.
0 2
97 Jeffrey Benner, Kyllo: Taking the Fifth on the Fourth (July 3, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1 848,44785,00.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
98 Id.
99 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1977).
100 Jamie L. Rhee, Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Airline Safety in the
Face of Terrorist Threats, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 847 (Spring 2000).
101 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).
102 Id.
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As a result, searches conducted as part of a general regulatory
scheme, done in furtherance of administrative goals rather than
to secure evidence of a crime, may be permissible under the
Fourth Amendment without any particularized showing of prob-
able cause.1 °3 An example of a permissible warrantless search
involves certain stops at border control checkpoints. Under the
judicially created administrative search exception, the Supreme
Court upheld the practice of border control agents who stop
and briefly inspect vehicles at checkpoints in order to search for
illegal aliens.' 4 First, the Court recognized that governmental
interests may in some situations trump Fourth Amendment pro-
tections. 10 5 The Court wrote, "government or public interest in
making such stops outweighs the constitutionally protected in-
terest of the private citizen." 106 Furthermore, the Court's opin-
ion relied on the fact that the search was brief in duration,
usually consisting of only a couple of questions and visual in-
spection. Since it did not greatly impede the flow of traffic or
consume too much of the traveler's time, the Court ruled that
the search was minimal in its intrusiveness given the govern-
ment's compelling interest in border control.
10 7
D. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TEST FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
Through case law, the Supreme Court established a three-
prong balancing test for warrantless administrative searches. 0
First, the government must establish a compelling need for the
intrusion. 109 Second, it must be shown that the intrusion will be
strictly limited to fulfilling that need and not be utilized for gen-
eral law enforcement purposes. 110 Third, the decision to search
103 See Davis, 482 F.2d at 908. Limited administrative searches may be con-
ducted at the border. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543 (1976); Davis, 482
F.2d at 893 (in airports); McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d at 897 (9th Cir. 1978) (in
state courthouses).




108 Balancing test is derived from the opinion in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979).
109 See United States v. $124,570 United States Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th
Cir. 1989), as cited in Rhee, supra note 100.
110 Id.
a particular person must not be subject to the discretion of the
officer in the field.111
A truly informed debate on these requirements relating to
CAPPS II is impossible because the profiling criteria are necessa-
rily secret. It is unknown what the limits will be. If the selection
methods were disclosed, they could be used by terrorists to
evade the profiles. However, the following section anticipates
some of the government's arguments, and possible reasoning
the courts might apply.
1. A Compelling Need for the Search
In the wake of September 11th, the government will be able
to show that there is a compelling need for heightened airport
security to prevent terrorist attacks. If illegal alien smuggling
and sobriety checkpoints justify warrantless searches,'1 2 then
surely the TSA will be able to justify heightened airport security
standards." 3 However, the actual data-mining programs of
CAPPS II may not pass scrutiny. The government must establish
a compelling need for the intrusion, and a court may decide
that there is no need to profile passengers if other means of
security are more effective. For example, the court might ques-
tion the need for CAPPS II since the FBI has maintained a no-fly
and a watch list on passengers for more than a decade." 4 On
the other hand, keeping dangerous people and items off of air-
craft may justify more intrusive behavior than would most ad-
ministrative searches.
2. Government Intrusion Must be Strictly Limited
Second, the government must show that the intrusion posed
by CAPPS II will be strictly limited to fulfilling the compelling
111 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
112 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32.
113 Judge Friendly, generally regarded as political liberal, wrote: "[w]hen the
risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of prop-
erty inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone
meets the test of reasonableness" for a search. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667,
675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J., concurring).
14 A recent FOIA lawsuit brought by Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) confirmed the existence of "no fly" and "selectee" lists maintained by the
TSA. An additional concern raised by EPIC was the near impossibility of getting
a name removed from the watch list, even if it was erroneously included. See
Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Transp. Sec. Adminin., at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/airtravel/tsa-foia-suit.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
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need for airline security." 5 Courts have stressed the importance
of keeping administrative searches from becoming "infected by
general law enforcement objectives, and the concomitant need
for the courts to maintain vigilance."11 6 Courts have expressed
an aversion to executive branch overreaching. One judge
warned that if the government is allowed to freely conduct dis-
criminatory searches under the guise of an administrative
search, then "officials [will] routinely invade the privacy and
property of countless millions; hardly anyone [will escape] their
clammy grasp. '117
This limitation precludes sharing of data between agencies.
"Function creep" is something that scares a lot of people as they
fear their private information will end up in the hands of other
agencies such as the IRS or the local police. Needless to say, it
also precludes use for non-official purposes. It is not uncom-
mon for personal records to be sold to marketers, or for individ-
uals to try to benefit from insider knowledge." 8 Also, a person
should not receive a yellow or red score based upon, for exam-
ple, being a deadbeat dad, having a judgment against him, or
even being convicted of a non-violent crime. The use of the
powerful system must be restrained to selecting only those who
pose a credible threat to the flight.
It is likewise unlawful to use a person's background to trigger
a security check to gather evidence for a crime not directed at
the aircraft. For example, every criminal background check that
CAPPS II does will include any drug-related offenses. The TSA
cannot flag that person as a selectee in order to get authoriza-
tion to search the luggage and person for illegal drugs. If they
do so, this unlawful evidence will be excluded under the exclu-
sionary rule. 19 In contrast, if the contraband is discovered inad-
vertently in conjunction with a weapons search, the authorities
113 $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1240.
116 Id.
117 United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993).
118 Indeed, it is not far-fetched for government officials to amass data for use in
silencing or attacking enemies, critics, undesirables, or radicals. For example, J.
Edgar Hoover accumulated an extensive collection of files with detailed informa-
tion about the private lives of numerous prominent individuals, including presi-
dents, members of Congress, and Supreme Court Justices. Daniel J. Solove,
Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Freedom, 75 So. CAL. L. REv.
1083 (2002).
119 $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1246.
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will be called and the evidence is wholly admissible. 120 The fact
that routine airport screening searches will occasionally lead to
discovery of contraband and apprehension of law violators does
not alter the essentially administrative nature of the screening
process nor render the searches unconstitutional. However, if
the screening process is subverted into a general search for evi-
dence of crime, courts must exclude the evidence obtained. 121
The government could meet this second burden by giving
binding assurances that the security information gathered
would not be used for any other purposes than airport security,
including other law enforcement purposes. Perhaps it could
create a private cause of action if it intentionally violates this
agreement. However, it will be tempting to use the compiled
information for a wider range of law enforcement objectives
than is mandated. If CAPPS II can use its pattern matching to
identify suspects and solve crimes while the suspect is standing
unarmed in an airport, it is understandable that the government
would want to take advantage of the opportunity to make an
arrest. However, the suspect would have grounds to argue that
the arrest was unlawful due to the violation of the administrative
search exception.
3. Administrative Searches Must Not Be Subject to an Individual
Officer's Discretion
In addition, to qualify as a warrantless administrative search,
the government must demonstrate that all persons are searched
equally no matter what level of suspicion they may arouse. 122
Another way the Court has phrased this is that the decision to
search a particular person must not be subject to the discretion
of the particular officer in the field. 123 For this reason, sobriety
checkpoints where everyone is examined have been permit-
120 Davis, 482 F.2d at 893. Passengers will be arrested when contraband is coin-
cidentally found during a routine baggage search. In fact, as a result of tighter
security in just one airport (Honolulu), in the six months following September
11, officials arrested 30 individuals and seized $273,000 in drugs. In the six
months before stricter security was employed, only two persons were arrested
with only $200 worth of drugs total according to Ed Howard, acting supervisor for
the state Narcotics Enforcement Division. War on Terror Aids War on Drugs,
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://starbulletin.com/
2002/03/20/editorial/editorials.html.
121 Id.
122 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543.
123 Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
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ted. 124 In the past, all airline passengers have been subjected to
exactly the same screening. In airline screening and sobriety
checkpoints, if the rudimentary inspection gave the officer a
reason to suspect driving under the influence or the carrying of
a suspicious item to an aircraft, the officer is then authorized to
make further findings.
To illustrate, in addressing border patrol checkpoints for ille-
gal aliens, the Supreme Court held "that the stops and question-
ing at issue may be made in the absence of any individualized
suspicion."'125 It was constitutional for the border patrol, after
routinely stopping or slowing automobiles at permanent check-
points, to refer motorists selectively to a secondary inspection
area for questions about citizenship and immigration status on
the basis of criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol
stop. 126 There was no constitutional violation even if such refer-
rals were made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican
ancestry.12
7
Most importantly, the Court said, what made the border con-
trol stops permissible was that everyone, regardless of suspicion,
was democratically screened, 128 at least initially. This is the most
difficult obstacle for CAPPS II to overcome because the primary
purpose of the CAPPS II profiling system is to single out individ-
uals who, because of undisclosed factors, pose a higher than av-
erage risk to the flight.
However, if the primary purpose of the third requirement is
to remove the potential for human discretion and abuse, CAPPS
II may prevail. In the border checkpoint case, the Court noted
that officers were sufficiently divested of discretion by the imme-
diate referral to a higher-ranking official for the secondary
screening. The potential abuse was also curtailed by this imme-
diate review and the official, permanent setting of the
checkpoint.
Similarly, the objective algorithms of CAPPS II remove the dis-
cretion from any particular officer, whether an agent of the air-
124 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 444.
125 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562.
126 Id. Authorization for a secondary inspection for limited inquiry on the ba-
sis of criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop, since the intrusion is
sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist to justify it, is analo-
gous to the stop and frisk exception described infra section VIII.E.
127 For criticism of this policy, see Alfredo Mirand6, Is There a Mexican Exception




line, or a TSA security screener. If the passenger's name draws a
yellow score, heightened security must follow. If a red score ap-
pears, law enforcement must be notified. CAPPS II will actually
decrease the importance of having airline employees and secur-
ity screeners "size up" and evaluate flyers for suspicious behav-
ior. Airline employees and security personnel will still have to
be vigilant for suspicious behavior, but they will be assisted by
the program that tracks non-apparent suspicious patterns.
Although CAPPS II divests the individual airline agent or se-
curity guard of discretion, the criteria used in the profiles are
undisclosed. Therefore, it is impossible to know whether any
human biases were programmed into the system. Although a
computer cannot make a visual assessment of appearance or be-
havior at a particular moment, there is no guarantee that the
computer will select persons in a manner more or less arbitrary
than a human agent.
Therefore, it is debatable whether the replacement of an offi-
cial's human subjectivity with an ostensibly objective computer
program will satisfy this prong. However, if the TSA mandates
personal background checks in the name of safety, it is probably
less intrusive and more practical to have a computer run them
confidentially off-site than to have a security guard or agent eval-
uate your history and situation as you await a boarding card.129
Further, the airlines would probably not agree to assume such a
discretionary role because of the animosity and liability it would
generate. A neutral off-site government computer is better
suited for such decisions. Regardless of who does the screening,
the ultimate result is the same whether conducted by an agent,
an official or a computer: a green light through security, a more
elaborate search perhaps accompanied by questioning, or a de-
nial of boarding.
4. Administrative Searches Must Be Reasonable
Finally, administrative screenings must be reasonable under
the circumstances. General Fourth Amendment standards of
reasonableness in the search context are discussed in the Katz
analysis. Additionally, in the administrative search context, the
Court has specifically stated that the search must be "limited in
its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the adminis-
129 On some international flights, particularly on El-Al, security personnel per-
sonally question travelers with such inquiries as, "Where are you going? What is
your purpose in going there? Who is meeting you?"
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trative need that justifies it."' ° Airport screening personnel are
bound to use restraint in intruding on the person and posses-
sions of travelers. In addition, a privacy limitation may impact
the selection of data that goes into the algorithms. The govern-
ment is not justified in using all of the private individual infor-
mation that it has available through its myriad of databases. It
must limit collection and use of information to that which spe-
cifically indicates peril to airlines, neither human faults or foi-
bles, nor other conclusions that can be drawn from the array of
information available.
Of course, the classified nature of the programs makes judi-
cial review difficult to accomplish. Yet, due to the importance of
carving exceptions into the Fourth Amendment and to the long-
term ramifications of court decisions, the Court wants the ad-
ministrative search exception construed narrowly.13 1 When de-
ciding whether an administrative search is permissible, courts
must not merely consider just the facts of the case before them,
but must consider all "searches permissible under the
scheme.' 13 2 To consider all possible searches resulting from
hundreds of different factors on hundreds of millions of trav-
elers per year is not possible, even in theory. Use of the reasona-
bleness standard here is simply too vast to apply in every possible
situation, including hypothetical situations. The Court would
have to simply make a judgment as to whether the tests sound
reasonable, and it probably will not venture to guess, given the
lack of information forthcoming from the TSA on the variable
factors. With the strict limits on the administrative search doc-
trine, it is uncertain whether the courts would approve of the
reasonableness of CAPPS II or the use of profiling at all, even
though the doctrine was developed partly for airline searches.
E. THE STOP-AND-FRISK EXCEPTION
The second type of Fourth Amendment exception under
which a potential airport security technique may qualify is the
stop-and-frisk exception. Under this type of exception, if secur-
ity personnel have a minimal level of justification that a person
may pose a threat of danger, they may conduct, without a war-
rant, a limited search of that person for the presence of
weapons.
130 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543.
131 Soyland, 3 F.3d at 1316.
132 Id.
This exception was established in Terry v. Ohio,131 where a
Cleveland police officer frisked two suspects and found guns.
He did not have a warrant to search the men. The Court al-
lowed the evidence of the search to be admitted despite the fact
that the officer was unable to prove a threshold level of proba-
ble cause. 134 It stated that the officer's objective observations of
the men staring into a storefront window a total of 24 times
showed suspicious behavior justifying a minimal search. The
Court decided that although the officer had not established
probable cause, 135 his objective observations of the men's suspi-
cious behavior provided enough justification.
Subsequent cases have further clarified what exactly consti-
tutes a minimal level of objective justification. In United States v.
Cortez,1 3 6 the Supreme Court decided that the "totality of circum-
stances" may be considered in determining if suspicion exists.
Security personnel need more than a hunch to conduct a stop-
and-frisk search, but they need not establish probable cause. At
airports around the world, a hunch is not required, merely a
beep from a metal detector. More precisely, given all of the cir-
cumstances, the suspicion must be based upon an enhanced
likelihood that the person poses harm. To qualify for this test,
the CAPPS II system must actually be effective in determining
who poses an increased threat.
CAPPS II-based security screening appears to qualify for the
motivational portion of the stop-and-frisk exception. By target-
ing people fitting a suspicious profile, the TSA would argue that
CAPPS II establishes sufficient objective justification.
Whether the intrusion is minimal is another issue. Com-
plaints from passengers who have been wrongly placed on the
existing TSA "watch list" or no-fly list have complained, describ-
ing hours of interrogation, strip searches, and missed flights as a
result of their "selection. '  Airline passengers who get a green
133 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
134 Id.
135 Probable cause is difficult to describe in the abstract, but basically, it is a
reasonable belief that a person has committed a crime. The test the court of
appeals employs to determine whether probable cause existed for purposes of
arrest is whether facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are suffi-
cient to warrant a prudent person to believe a suspect has committed, is commit-
ting, or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1300
(9th Cir. 1992).
136 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
137 In a recently resolved FOIA lawsuit between the TSA and EPIC, the TSA
released approximately 100 complaint letters written to the TSA by passengers
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light from the CAPPS II system will still be subject to random
"stop and frisk" searches. Presumably those drawing a yellow
light or a red light will be subject to more than a brief, minimal
search. Depending on how far the courts are willing to stretch
the definition of "limited searches," it is debatable whether
CAPPS II will qualify for an exception under the stop and frisk
standards, at least for those passengers requiring heightened
scrutiny.
F. CONSENT AND IMPLIED CONSENT DOCTRINE
Like other civil rights, the Fourth Amendment may be waived.
One may consent to a search of the person or premises by offi-
cials who have not complied with Constitutional requirements.
The burden is on the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of
the consent, 138 and awareness of the right to decline the search,
and thus, not fly. The reviewing court must determine on the
basis of the totality of the circumstances whether consent has
been freely given or has been coerced. 13 9
Officials are not required to inform a person of his Fourth
Amendment rights to resist an airport search, as they are re-
quired to give a Miranda warning to an arrestee. 4 ° The only
requirement is that the officials do not indicate that the suspect
is not free to leave. 4 ' In other words, the person must not feel
coerced, and must feel that he or she is free to leave. Of course,
who were detained, questioned, and/or denied boarding in recent months. The
pattern establishes that these detentions were not minimal. See EPIC, Recently
Concluded Matters, at http://www.epic.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
138 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (discussing fac-
tors used to determine if consent is voluntary). Consent must be voluntary and
free of duress and coercion. Id. The fact finder considers the totality of the
circumstances to determine if voluntariness was present. The Court also decided
that while knowledge of the right to refuse is a factor in the determination of
voluntariness, it is not essential to demonstrating consent. Id. at 249. While it is
clear that an individual may expressly waive constitutional rights through con-
sent, the problem arises in the context of whether a passenger automatically con-
sents to a search as a precondition to boarding the aircraft. Several
commentators have held that under such circumstances, the "voluntariness" ele-
ment is lacking.
139 $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1246. But see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249
(stating that individual's knowledge of right to refuse is not element of valid
consent).
140 Id. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda is fundamen-
tally a due process case and does not involve the Fourth Amendment directly.
However CAPPS II may pose 14th Amendment due process concerns, but this is
beyond the scope of this paper.
141 Id.
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according to federal law, airlines must deny a person access to
the flight if the person does not consent to the physical search
or refuses to present identification so that the CAPPS II search
can be performed.
Have we already waived our rights by passing through current
airport security? The Second Circuit has hinted that implied
consent is something that is inherent and obvious in airport
screening. 142 The court in Davis recognized that in the airport
screening area, the passenger has a choice of submitting to the
search or leaving. 43 If the individual chooses to proceed, a re-
linquishment of Fourth Amendment rights occurs.144 Of
course, all of these rules apply to routine and random physical
searches of individuals and luggage. These rules have not yet
been applied to an electronic information screening technique
where the violation is not to the person directly, but to privacy
interests in the abstract. Furthermore, the vast majority of trav-
elers are oblivious to the fact that their backgrounds are being
checked. Even if they knew that they were being investigated,
the secret nature of the CAPPS II system makes it impossible to
give knowing, voluntary consent. If consent is not "knowing," it
cannot be given or implied. Therefore, the implied consent
doctrine applies to the physical portion of the search, but there
is no waiver of consent to the surreptitious background check.
G. NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
Nothing like September lth has happened before, so it is
difficult to predict how Congress and the courts will view the
liberty versus security tradeoff offered by CAPPS II. In times of
war or national emergency, civil liberties have, for better or for
worse, been sacrificed in the name of safety and security. 45
Although the Katz test has many applications, it may not apply
to issues of national security. In a concurrence of the Katz
142 United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1974). "[I]t would
outrage common sense to suppose that an intelligent woman, neither blind nor
deaf nor ignorant of the language, was not aware as the district judge found 'that
she was as free to step out of the line of passengers (as she had been to enter that
line) if she did not want her baggage to be searched." Id. (quoting United States
v. Edwards, 359 F. Supp. 764, 767 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)).
143 Davis, 482 F.2d at 893.
144 Id.
145 For example, the detention ofJapanese-Americans in World War II wasjus-
tified using the national security exception. See Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
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case, 4 6 Justice White explicitly preserved the possibility that in
the case of "national security," electronic surveillance upon the
authority of the President or Attorney General could be permis-
sible without prior judicial approval. He reasoned that "domes-
tic security surveillance may involve different policy and
practical considerations from the surveillance of 'ordinary
crime."' In a foreshadowing of CAPPS II he explained,
The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and
involves the interrelation of various sources and types of informa-
tion. Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth
Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legiti-
mate need of Government for intelligence information and the
protected rights of our citizens ... the warrant application may
vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and
the nature of citizen rights deserving protection. 14 7
IX. CONCLUSION
Reasonable minds will differ on which is the bigger threat:
sporadic terrorists or daily submission to intrusive government
surveillance. CAPPS II is so novel that it doesn't precisely fit any
of the Fourth Amendment prohibitions or exceptions. Further,
the program is targeted at thwarting terrorism, which, unlike
most crimes, has national security implications. CAPPS II in-
volves public policy as much as law. Judges in favor of the pro-
gram will find something in the Fourth Amendment that can
sustain it, and those opposed will likewise find grounds to strike
it down. However, the Department of Homeland Security is not
investing billions of dollars into a system that it believes will be
struck down by the courts.
In the court of public opinion, many people will be indiffer-
ent, and some fearful fliers will view the program with relief.
Others will be outraged at being treated as criminal suspects by
a massive government data surveillance system shrouded in se-
crecy. The issue is political and philosophical. In the words of
Benjamin Franklin: "They that can give up essential liberty to
obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor
146 Katz, 389 U.S. at 363-64.
147 Id.
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safety.' 1 4 ' And in the words of Sun Microsystems' CEO Scott
McNealy: "You have Zero privacy anyway-get over it!"' 49
148 The Quotable Franklin, available at ttp://www.ushistory.org/franklin/quot
able/quote04.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
149 Wired News, Sun on Privacy: 'Get Over It' (Jan. 26, 1999), available at http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,17538,00.html; Information Week, Privacy
Tools and Services Debut (Aug. 20, 2001), available at http://www.informationweek.
com/story/IWK20010816S0005.
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